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  As part of the Nestlé Group, Nescafé Dolce Gusto was launched in Portugal in 
2007 aiming to democratize an entire market segment exclusively owned by Nespresso 
until then: coffee capsules. Five years of successes later, António Sousa, the brand’s 
marketing manager, was faced with a few challenging circumstances which inevitably he 
had to address. He was witnessing an industry that never stopped growing year after year. 
Unfortunately, Nescafé Dolce Gusto was not alone driving this growth, as other players 
began surfacing and claiming their spot. The business environment had become 
aggressively competitive and resorting to sales promotions was revealing itself as a quick 
way to stay relevant, yet at the cost of profitability.  Nonetheless, recovering market share 
lost to the main competitors was the key objective for 2012. Recent tax policy changes 
due to the economic crisis caused Nescafé Dolce Gusto to become the only brand selling 
a standard capsules pack at a price point above €5. António knew he had to start from 
there if he was to achieve the proposed targets. Surprisingly, he found out the solution 
could in fact be to develop a new promotional pack, differently sized and priced than the 
regular 16 capsules pack offered. At the end of the day, he had to choose between going 
for a 12 capsules pack or a 30 capsules pack, and this decision could be the most important 
he made in years.  
Resumo 
Título: Aumentando o gap: Como a Nescafé Dolce Gusto lutou num ambiente 
competitivo hostil 
Autor: João Miguel Moreira Lamarão 
 Como parte do Grupo Nestlé, a Nescafé Dolce Gusto foi lançada em Portugal em 
2007 com o intuito de democratizar um segmento de mercado detido na totalidade pela 
Nespresso até então: o café em cápsulas. Cinco anos de sucessos depois, António Sousa, 
o gestor de marketing da marca, foi confrontado com algumas circunstâncias desafiantes, 
as quais ele teria inevitavelmente de abordar. Assistia a uma indústria que não parava de 
crescer ano após ano. Infelizmente, a Nescafé Dolce Gusto não estava sozinha neste 
crescimento à medida que outros players começavam a surgir e a tomar o seu lugar. O 
enquadramento empresarial tinha-se tornado agressivamente competitivo e recorrer à 
promoção de vendas era uma maneira rápida de tornar as marcas relevantes, a custo da 
rentabilidade. No entanto, recuperar a quota de mercado perdida para os principais 
concorrentes era o grande objetivo para 2012. Uma mudança recente na política de 
impostos devido à crise económica fez com que a Nescafé Dolce Gusto se tornasse na 
única marca com um pacote standard de cápsulas acima da barreira dos €5. António sabia 
que teria de começar por aí se ia cumprir as metas propostas. Surpreendentemente, 
descobriu que a solução poderia estar no desenvolvimento de um novo pacote 
promocional, de dimensão e preço diferentes em comparação com o pacote de 16 cápsulas 
regular. A decisão final era escolher entre um pacote de 12 cápsulas ou um de 30 cápsulas, 
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 It was a rainy Friday morning of April, the rainiest of the year so far, and as long 
as António Sousa2 could remember. He was Nescafé Dolce Gusto’s marketing manager 
for the Portuguese market, a coffee capsule system brand owned by the Nestlé Group, 
and one of the latter’s most important brands in terms of sales revenue3. It seemed like 
the rain served as an irony for the decisions António had to make later that day. He was 
witnessing one of Portugal’s most dynamic industries, as it was still growing at an 
impressive rate and every year a handful of new players would appear in the market. 
Something remarkable, considering only ten years ago there was a single brand operating 
its coffee capsule monopoly, Nespresso. While working in such a marketplace was 
extremely rewarding, it could easily become somewhat of a headache. 
 So much had changed since Nescafé Dolce Gusto’s arrival in 2007 to the country, 
especially in the fast-moving consumer goods industry. These days, promotions were one 
of the few strategies to truly make a brand grow in sales, especially in the single-serve 
coffee segment. António did not expect five years ago the level of investment his brand 
would have to make in order to assure a minimum level of sustainable growth. At the 
same time, retailer brands were continuing to increase their market shares in nearly every 
product category, and while this was not true in coffee capsules many years ago, it was 
now. The everyday low price positioning was tremendously difficult to match. 
 The challenge for 2012 was to take a significant step towards recovering the 
market share lost in the past, in other words, to increase the gap between Nescafé Dolce 
Gusto and its competitors. António recently had found out the solution could actually be 
related to a sales promotion tactic, which again was ironic. Part of the strategy being 
drawn to fill this gap incorporated a new promotional capsules pack, one that would 
exponentially increase sales. Essentially it meant deciding between launching a smaller 
or a larger pack. He had a meeting with his team scheduled for after lunch, and there were 
                                                          
1 This case was written during 2014/15 however, it depicts events occurred during 2012 and before. 
2 António Sousa is a fictional character created for the purpose of this case story. 
3 Source: Nestlé internal data. 
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still five hours to go. He grew impatient and anxiously started to organize his ideas to 
later present them. 
 
The Portuguese FMCG4 situation 
Ongoing crisis 
2011 was yet another year to be filled with crisis related news headlines, and 
Portugal was probably one of the most talked about countries in Europe regarding this 
harsh tendency. As the list of worst performers in the continent was disclosed, the 
Portuguese witnessed an unsurprising 2nd place, only being beaten by the Greeks5. The 
feeling was legitimate, as more than 85% of the population admitted to feel an immediate 
effect of the economic crisis. Half even described this impact as extremely significant6. 
This climate had clear repercussions on purchasing power, which reached the lowest point 
in 27 years7, as prices increased, wages stayed flat or decreased, and consumption levels 
were affected for all kinds of industries. 
Indeed, these circumstances had even higher consequences on Portugal’s FMCG 
setting. The shopper’s8 behavior reflected this trend: more buying frequency with less 
spending per act of purchase, while increasingly preferring the large retail areas, as 
opposed to traditional ones, and consequently investing more and more on retailers’ own-
brands9. According to Kantar Worldpanel, these brands would achieve a historic 37% 
market share in FMCG product categories (fresh products excluded) in 2011. To validate 
this preference, a study by Deco revealed that by choosing retailer brands instead of 
manufacturer brands, shoppers achieved up to 30% in savings10. Furthermore, 
circumstances were aggravated by a 10% increase in VAT, a measure implemented by 
the government in the beginning of the year. Due to this adjustment, an average 
expenditure increment of up to 17 euros annually per household was predicted, in a 
                                                          
4 Fast-moving consumer goods. 
5 Source: Jornal de Notícias online (2011). 
6 Source: Diário de Notícias online (2011). 
7 Source: Económico online (2011). 
8 The concept of shopper is defined as the individual who makes in-store purchase decisions. 
9 Source: Marketeer online (2011). 
10 Source: Hipersuper online (2011). 
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FMCG context11. A 0.2% negative growth in industry volume between 2010 and 201112 
was a consequence of the inflation. 
Sales promotion as the main driver 
The number of sales promotion activities in FMCG rose significantly since the 
beginning of the economic crisis, with levels of investment coming to more than 4.7 
billion euros13. In addition, a global study by Simon-Kucher & Partner’s14 in 2011, 
exposed a market share addicted industry, driven by constant price reductions, which then 
leads to drops in margins and consequently loss of money. In the study, the interviewed 
managers acknowledged that 3 out of 4 promotional activities planned by them had a 
negative return on investment. 
Surely, in the context of crisis low prices and promotions were mandatory to 
survive. Portuguese shoppers were increasingly price aware, rational and demanding 
regarding their decisions. They were revealed to have great price notions and awareness 
and being considerably promotion-driven in their shopping behavior, pointing to the fact 
that for them a store that offered promotions was not a differentiating attribute, but 
something that was already expected15. Perhaps one of the most notable events in 
Portugal’s recent sales promotions history was the special Worker’s Day promotion 
carried out at Pingo Doce’s16 stores. On May 1st 2012 shoppers who purchased over €100 
worth of goods were offered 50% discount over the total spending. Due to the highly 
aggressive rebate, some stores were so crowded that they had to close as early as 11 in 
the morning to avoid putting people’s health at risk17. Such situation undoubtedly portrays 
a perfect example of an intense and oftentimes hostile FMCG environment. 
                                                          
11 Source: Hipersuper online (2011). 
12 Source: Nielsen Shopper Trends report (2012). 
13 Source: Marketeer online (2011). 
14 Source: Promotions in the Retail Industry: Study elaborated by Simon-Kucker & Partners in 
collaboration with Sartia (Extract) (2011). 
15 Source: Nielsen Shopper Trends report (2012). 
16 Pingo Doce was the 2nd largest player in the food retail. 
17 Source: Publico Online (2012). 
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The Company   
Nestlé S.A. 
Nestlé S.A was the Swiss multinational behind Nescafé Dolce Gusto (from now 
on referred as NDG). It was the largest food and beverage company in the world with a 
sales revenue of 83.6 billion CHF18 in 201119. It had over 333,000 employees spread 
across more than 150 countries, with almost 500 factories in 86 of them, covering beyond 
2,000 different brands as there were nearly 1 billion Nestlé products sold every day. While 
this dominance was evident, this volume represented only 1.7% of the industry, as the top 
20 largest companies make up less than 9% of it. The food and beverages industry was 
highly segregated, translating in a great number of local players across the globe. In 2011, 
powdered & liquid beverages, in which coffee was included, was the company’s highest 
revenue generating product category20.  
Its origin dated back to 1867, when founder Henri Nestlé, created the first milk-
based baby food, farine lactée (later known as Cerelac), which saved the lives of 
numerous children who could not breastfeed at the time. Over the years Nestlé would 
make several mergers and acquisitions causing the Nestlé Group to comprise highly 
diversified food and beverage categories. The company famously stated that there is a 
Nestlé product for each moment of the day. Its mission was to be recognized as the leader 
in Nutrition, Health and Wellness. 
 
Nestlé Portugal S.A. 
Nestlé Portugal was born in 1923 when Professor Egas Moniz (Nobel Medicine 
Prize in 1949) decided to follow Henri Nestlé’s footsteps by establishing the first 
powdered milk factory in the country, having contributed to reduce the serious infant 
nutritional deficiencies of the time. This factory was later acquired by Nestlé. In Portugal, 
the company performed in several business areas, namely infant nutrition, roast and 
ground coffee, coffee and soluble mixes, chocolate, breakfast cereals, ice cream, mineral 
                                                          
18 Approximately €78 billion. 
19 Source: Nestlé annual report (2011). 
20 Source: Nestlé corporate presentation (2012). 
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water and pet food, being the leader in most of these categories. The sales revenue in 2012 
was 467 million euros, with roughly 20% representing exports21.  It has over 1,800 
employees and four factories. 
 
Nespresso 
The player that revolutionized the world coffee industry more than 25 years ago, 
Nespresso pioneered the premium portioned coffee segment and still remains the 
reference in it today. In the second half of the 1980’s Nespresso SA was created inside 
the Nestlé Group and it first took a few years before its concept was fully internationally 
accepted and patented protected. As soon as the company figured out that coffee capsules 
targeted to home consumers was the winning business model, it began selling online, 
opening premium brick & mortar stores called Nespresso Boutiques at prime locations, 
and establishing a consumer community through the Nespresso Club22. For the past three 
decades Nespresso had achieved independent and autonomous management from Nestlé, 
being then present in over 60 countries, employing nearly 10,000 people and exceeding 
annual sales of 1 billion CHF23 24, a value that added up to the more than 27 billion 
capsules sold worldwide since its foundation25.   
Besides its original premium positioning, Nespresso had turned its focus on both 
B2C and B2B channels, with clear efforts on delivering the highest quality coffee possible 
in the capsule form-factor through the use of continuous innovation. Each year the 
company launched several new grand cru26 coffees as well as different designed coffee 
machines that introduced new features along the way. The most differentiating element 
however, was probably the Nespresso Club, a community of consumers leveraged by the 
firm’s position in the online channel (an e-commerce platform first introduced in 199827) 
that offered them an array of personalized services and a close relationship with the brand. 
In fact, the choice of Hollywood actor George Clooney as the brand ambassador back in 
                                                          
21 Source: Nestlé Portugal corporate brochure (2013). 
22 Source: Ecommerce-Digest online. 
23 Approximately €930 million. 
24 Source: Nestle-Nespresso online. 
25 Source: New York Times online (2012). 
26 Grand Cru refers to the flavor of the Nespresso coffee capsule. 
27 Source: Nespresso History Factsheet. 
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2006 was made by club members28, as part of the brand’s first world acclaimed 
communication campaign. 
Nespresso was clearly ahead of its time when it forged the coffee capsule system 
(from now on referred as CCS) idea and brought it to life, and as with all pioneers, there 
comes a time when patents expire and the road for competitors to thrive becomes clear. 
The industry became extremely dynamic as other players entered the market and made it 
gradually less concentrated. Other manufacturers came up with their own proprietary 
CCS and even retailer brands launched their own.  
For the Portuguese market, Nespresso made its debut in 2003 and managed to be 
the sole player for 4 years. As usual, sales were channeled largely through the online 
store, as well as marginally through the growing network of boutique store locations. As 
of 2011, Nespresso was the leader in capsule sales, but not in machines, even though 13% 
of Portuguese homes owned a Nespresso coffee machine and 37% of the cumulative 
number of machines were Nespresso branded29. The position occupied for capsules in 
terms of volume was 47% of the total market, approximately 260 million units sold 
(leadership acquired in sales value as well)30. Nonetheless, here the growth tendency was 
negative, as sales were quickly being transferred to other players every year (See exhibit 
1). 
The introduction of such a concept in a country like Portugal had serious 
implications for the coffee industry, and Nespresso was able to influence a culture of out-
of-home consumption to an in-home one. While this was true, the Nespresso CCS was 
not cheap by any means, mainly due to the initial investment that had to be made in a 
coffee machine. The price for these started at above €100 for the most basic type of 
machine, although the average price for a single capsule was remarkably competitive at 
just €0.33 per unit, as they were sold in packs of 10 capsules each (See exhibit 2), and so 
consumers would easily reach break-even point after investing in a machine. 
 
                                                          
28 Source: Nespresso History Factsheet. 
29 Source: GFK (2011). 




Nescafé had been one the most famous coffee brands in the world and it was the 
most important brand for the Nestlé Group in terms of sales, with approximately 11 billion 
CHF31 in 201132. The concept behind it originated in Brazil in the 1930s, when the 
government challenged Nestlé to create a quality soluble coffee that would keep the 
coffee’s original flavor. After nearly seven years of research and development, Nescafé 
was launched in Switzerland, having expanded to other countries shortly afterwards. It 
grew to become the world reference in soluble coffee. In Portugal, the power of the 
Nescafé brand was fairly modest, as the market for soluble coffees was extremely small, 
at less than 10% of the total coffee market33. 
 
Nescafé Dolce Gusto 
In 2006, Nestlé decided it wanted Nescafé to give continuity to the path built by 
Nespresso for more than two decades. It firmly believed that the future of coffee was in 
single-serve capsules and that Nescafé had to follow the trend. NDG was born. An 
espresso machine, resulting of a partnership with Krups34, a coffee capsule system that 
was capable of handling not only hot, but cold beverages as well, with a proprietary and 
innovative technology and irreverent design. It was described as being a multi-beverage 
system. France and Germany were the first markets to launch the newly created brand. 
Portugal was part of the first wave of countries to be able to launch NDG and so 
in the following year it met that goal. The brand sought to completely reinvent the way 
of having beverages at home, through the elements of pleasure, quality, variety, 
availability, convenience and design. It achieved this by seeking a broader target 
consumer, younger, attracted by the new tendencies, aiming to be a product that could 
reach any home with medium purchasing power. Evidently, NDG came with an unusual 
variety of beverages for a capsule system. They were hot and cold ones, so that the whole 
family could enjoy and was now sold in modern distribution (in addition to having an 
                                                          
31 Approximately €10 billion. 
32 Source: Nestlé anual report (2012). 
33 Source: Diário de Notícias online according to Nielsen (2006). 
34 A world renowned coffee machine manufacturer owned by Groupe SEB, the world leader in small 
household electric appliances. 
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online store), as opposed to Nespresso’s e-commerce and boutique strategy. NDG would 
democratize the coffee capsule market in Portugal, since the only player at the time 
followed a more premium approach. The acceptance was exceptionally positive and the 
country would become a top 5 market for Nestlé in NDG. 
The new concept in coffee capsule systems was of high build quality and 
particularly ease of use. The possibility to choose a hot or cold beverage was its main 
selling point, as well as the proprietary capsule. Melody, NDG’s first coffee machine was 
available in three different colors at the time of launch, with two different price-points, 
one being higher due to a special metal finish (See exhibit 3). Consequently, there were 
five different capsules available in the first year: Espresso Intenso, Decaffeinato, 
Chococino, Cappuccino and Latte Macchiato (See exhibit 4). The beverages that were 
made of two distinct ingredients were named white cups, due to the fact that for instance, 
a single Chococino beverage had to be made with a black capsule containing a chocolate 
powder blend and an extra white one containing milk. The pricing was aligned with the 
market: €0.27 for a single NDG Espresso as opposed to the average €0.55 in a typical 
Portuguese coffee shop and €0.30 for a Nespresso. A NDG Cappuccino however, would 
be significantly cheaper than one purchased out-of-home, €0.53 versus €1.5 on average. 
A standard pack of NDG capsules contained 16 units, when most of the competition 
offered only 10. 
Indeed, the distribution strategy of NDG was critical for its success. Since it was 
a two-sided business (machine and capsule) there had to be an integrated strategy between 
Nestlé and Krups that would assure the presence of a NDG machine inside the homes of 
Portuguese consumers. The machines were not a direct source of revenue however, the 
capsules were, and therefore synergies had to be thoroughly created. Krups retained all 
the margins regarding their machines, as they were responsible not only for 
manufacturing them, but also working in a sell-in35 perspective. On the other hand, Nestlé 
collected margins in capsules and was responsible for supporting Krups with selling their 
machines in a sell-out36 standpoint, meaning all the marketing communications strategy 
was outlined by the NDG team. It was decided a generalized distribution strategy for the 
brand, with only machines being sold at home appliance stores, both machines and 
                                                          
35 Sell-in is the act of selling a good to a customer, namely a retailer, in the manufacturer’s perspective. 
36 Sell-out is the act of selling a good to a consumer, in the retailer’s perspective. 
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capsules being sold at hypermarkets and large supermarkets, and only capsules being sold 
at small supermarkets. The placement for capsules in the shelf was near the roast and 
ground coffee section. 
 
The Coffee Industry 
In the World 
One of the most consumed beverages in the world, Coffee was also considered the 
2nd most valuable commodity since the 1970’s, falling behind crude oil37. Almost 8.5 
million tons of coffee were produced in 201138, where over 90% of the volume came from 
developing countries, with Brazil as the undisputable top producer, followed by Vietnam 
and Indonesia (See exhibit 5). As for coffee consumption, Finland was at the top of the 
list, with an average of 12 kg per capita in 2008, followed by Norway and Iceland. 
Portugal came in 24th place, just above the United States, at an average of 4.3 kg per capita 
(See exhibit 6). The average annual consumption growth rate for the past 10 years was 
2.5% however, the rate for the traditional markets of North America, Western Europe and 
Japan was considerable lower at 1.1%39. At this rate, the industry could reach 9.5 billion 
tons by 2020. Yet, the International Coffee Organization alerted that the global financial 
and economic crisis, combined with the rising of production costs, could lead to a 
reduction in coffee supply, which consequently could slow down coffee consumption. 
The top 3 companies leading this growth in terms of sales value (excluding retailer 
brands) were Nestlé, Kraft Foods and Sara Lee as of 2011 (See exhibit 7). In value the 
entire industry grew 11% versus the previous year. 
 
In Portugal 
The Portuguese were well known for their coffee consumption habits, especially 
the out-of-home espresso, or bica40, even though they were not even a top 20 country in 
                                                          
37 Source: UN Conference on Trade and Development Commodity Yearbook. 
38 Source: UN Food & Agriculture Organization (2011). 
39 Source: Academia do Café online according to International Coffee Organization (2011). 
40 Bica is a Portuguese expression for espresso coffee. 
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terms of consumption per capita (See exhibit 6). In 2011, about 76% of the population 
followed this habit, with a slight growth tendency in domestic consumption since 2009, 
going from 20% to 24% for in-home consumption41. Essentially, the economic crisis was 
believed to be the reason behind this shift. The daily average was 2.2 cups per capita and 
logically the most preferred type of coffee was the espresso, as well as capsules or pods42 
that allowed for a simpler and cleaner way of making coffee. Total consumption reached 
25.2 million cups of coffee (covering only 85% of the market), which translated in nearly 
370 million euros. As of that year there were roughly 40 relevant coffee brands in Portugal 
owned by 16 companies that make up 85% of the market43. Delta Cafés, Nestlé and 
retailer brands as a whole were the top 3 players in terms of sales value in descending 
order (See exhibit 8). The entire Portuguese market grew 18% in value from 2010 to 
2011. 
 
The Single-serve Coffee Industry 
In the world 
Granted being a small industry, representing sales of up to 5 billion euros in 2011 
(just 8% of the total coffee industry), the single-serve coffee business (capsules and pods) 
was continuously showing signs of being a fast-growing category, since this value 
indicated a 31.3% increase versus the previous year44. France was a firm leader as the 
most valuable single-serve coffee market, followed by Germany and USA. Portugal came 
in at 10th place (See exhibit 9). As for the main players, Nestlé held the top spot with 35% 
share, followed by Sara Lee (18%) and Kraft Foods (8%) (See exhibit 10). Most 
importantly, a third of the total industry consisted of numerous other smaller players, from 
which retailer brands were to be noted45.  
 
                                                          
41 Source: Academia do Café online (2012). 
42 Coffee capsules are single-serve portions inside an aluminum or plastic capsule shaped container, 
whereas coffee pods are small paper pouches that hold a single-serve portion as well. 
43 Source: Academia do Café online (2012). 
44 Source: Reuters online (2012). 




The single-serve coffee industry in Portugal had proven to be one of the most 
dynamic and valuable in the world. Indeed, once Nespresso had placed the building 
blocks for the whole industry, other players were inevitably going to emerge. Just one 
month after NDG rolled out to the Portuguese market, the country’s leading coffee 
company Delta Cafés, created its own CCS brand, Delta Q, a multi-beverage system like 
NDG’s (See exhibit 2). As national coffee experts, Delta Q’s positioning was considered 
as mainstream, though it was significantly close to Nespresso’s premium setting. It even 
adopted a mixed distribution strategy, having its own boutiques, an online store and being 
available for purchase at modern distribution. Three years later, retailer Pingo Doce46 
turned Portugal into the first market to have a retailer brand CCS (See exhibit 2), a highly 
disruptive move that would democratize the whole industry even more. Its positioning 
was like any other retailer brand, price oriented, and evidently it could be sold only at 
Pingo Doce’s stores. By the end of 2011, the market was occupied by five main players 
Nespresso, NDG, Delta Q, Pingo Doce and Tassimo47 (See exhibit 11). 
When considering only capsules, the market was growing over 44% equally in 
volume and value sales48. Nespresso was leading with 47% market share in volume 
(although with 1,500 basis points less than the previous year), followed by NDG with 
23% market share, Delta Q with 17%, and retailer brands with 10%, which were generally 
represented by Pingo Doce (See exhibit 1). As for machines, home penetration was 35%, 
with Nespresso appearing in first place, followed by NDG49 and Delta Q50. Strikingly, 
this level of penetration for Portugal was the highest when compared to the rest of the 
world. Additionally, price was the main driver for this market. In one year, the average 
price dropped from €144 to €8751 per machine. Pingo Doce was the primary responsible 
for this decrease, offering its own branded machine at a price-point of only €49, a measure 
that would make it the leader in sales volume immediately after launching. The market 
                                                          
46 Pingo Doce was widely famous for its quality own brand. 
47 Tassimo was one of Kraft Foods’ coffee brands. 
48 Source: GFK (2011). 
49 Portugal had the highest home penetration percentage in the world for NDG machines. 
50 Source: GFK (2011). 
51 Source: Nestlé internal data (2011). 
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experienced considerable growth in volume, but nearly zero in sales value, clearly due to 
the observed price cuts. 
 
First steps, from 2007 to 2010 
António recognized that NDG was probably Nestlé’s most important innovation 
since Nespresso, as a source of revenue point of view. This meant that strategic markets 
for the brand had a relevant amount of marketing budget to handle and with it achieve 
ambitious goals. Portugal was fortunate to be selected immediately after the first year of 
introduction in France and Germany. NDG’s initial marketing strategy was described as 
an integrated communications approach in a path-to-purchase perspective. Typically, four 
main building blocks, each consisting of different above and below the line activities, that 
when combined influenced consumers to be near a purchase decision (See exhibit 12).  
First off, it was necessary to generate brand awareness inside the homes of 
potential NDG consumers and inform them about the characteristics of the product (See 
exhibit 13). To do so, the team relied on mass media by means of TV spots each year that 
focused on NDG’s ability to be a multi-beverage system, as well as the unique design 
features and shapes of its machines. Some noteworthy taglines used on these ads were “A 
coffee shop inside your home” and “Be surprised by a new world of beverages”. In 
addition, radio was also a part of NDG’s campaigns throughout the first years, through 
the use of sponsored sweepstakes on Portugal’s most listened morning shows. The online 
store was also a very useful tool for spreading the brand’s message. As soon as there were 
sufficient users online, NDG began taking advantage of the collected consumer 
information and developed select CRM52 campaigns when launching new capsules or 
machines, which were primarily price reductions. Consequently, such launching events 
were leveraged offline by inviting Portuguese celebrities to attend them, as a clear PR53 
move.  
However, potential NDG consumers did not spend all their time at home, therefore 
it was necessary to impact and engage them out-of-home (See exhibit 13). To achieve 
                                                          
52 Customer Relationship Management. 
53 Public relations. 
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this goal the brand relied mainly on outdoor advertising, placed at Portugal’s most busy 
streets and avenues. At shopping malls, people witnessed island stands with large scale 
NDG coffee machines on top being showcased as a way to surely catch their attention. 
Other occasions, such as national congresses and university events were also 
opportunities for NDG to be present as a coffee-break provider. 
Having assured the last two premises, NDG coupled the above described 
marketing communication activities with specific actions to guide the consumer inside 
the store (See exhibit 13). “POS54 brand activation was a critical success factor for 
NDG’s beginning in the Portuguese market, and continues to be”, António pointed out. 
Store entrance alarm strips were used several times to display ads, POS materials were 
combined to form a NDG shop-in-shop55, ambassador stands56 were created to showcase 
the entire product portfolio and even extra display stands were placed at unusual stores, 
like home decoration ones. 
Finally, NDG relied on complementary POS activities to trigger the purchase at 
store shelves (See exhibit 13). Again, numerous in-store brand activations were made 
possible with corridor islands, ends of gondola and display stands. Ultimately, tasting 
events were exceptionally important to complement the entire path-to-purchase and 
convince shoppers to become NDG consumers. 
By the end of the considered period, NDG was not only an exceptional performer 
in the Portuguese market, but was also presented with several distribution, consumer and 
design awards, which were the public’s recognition for the António and his team’s efforts.  
Despite NDG’s performance up until then, 2010 was an important year for the 
competition. Surprisingly, Portugal’s coffee leader Delta Cafés had not leveraged its 
capsule brand Delta Q reasonably enough to become a serious threat. At the same time, 
Pingo Doce made one of the most important product launches of the industry, by 
becoming the first retailer in the world to have its own CCS brand, which in this case was 
a multi-beverage offering as well. Subsequently, Tassimo entered the market with yet 
another multi-beverage system. Therefore, even though these players had only started to 
                                                          
54 Point-of-sales. 
55 The shop-in-shop concept refers to creating a special space in-store that resembles a small shop for a 
single brand. 
56 A unique NDG display stand made from premium materials showcasing the entire NDG product 
portfolio, from machines to capsules. 
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scratch the surface, it only meant that their growth margin was potentially higher than 
NDG’s and ultimately their moves had to be closely watched in the years to come.   
 
Buondi & Sical in capsules, fighting local with local 
António’s suspicions regarding what the competition could do in the short term 
proved to be correct. A perfect example was when NDG launched the first machine under 
€100, the Piccolo at €79 (See exhibit 14). Just two months later Pingo Doce announced 
their new model at €49. Such a move was the primary responsible for a sales volume 
boost in the coffee capsules machine market. “The effort of buying a coffee capsule 
machine was no longer emotional, retailer brands started to depreciate this side of the 
purchase decision and so 2011 was the year we fought the most for the machine market, 
trying not to deteriorate it even more in terms of sales value”, António confessed. At a 
certain point in time, coffee capsule machines below €70 per unit represented more than 
half of total sales in the market57. On the other hand, NDG’s greatest rival, Delta Q, while 
having to be preoccupied with the previous issues as well, was showing no signs of 
slowing down. It turned its focus to innovation by launching, for instance, a range of tea 
capsules in a partnership with Tetley and a “Power Coffee” capsule, aimed at consumers 
who needed the immediate caffeine boost, such as students and so on. At the same time, 
NDG’s closer brother and competitor Nespresso continued to be the leader and was still 
a benchmark of the industry, granted it was not competing in the food retail channel. 
Moreover, various other players were gradually entering market taking their own spot 
(See exhibit 1). An industry that was extremely concentrated at its genesis, and for the 
many years that followed it, was growing towards the opposite effect. 
While attempting to improve the machines situation, António and the NDG team 
knew something had to be done on the capsules side. Undeniably, innovation was held as 
the one of most important growth driver of such an industry although, on paper, sales 
promotions were the answer to many momentary problems. The strategy had to be long-
term. At this stage, only one of two things could be done: either continue on leveraging 
the success of the espresso range of capsules, or do something completely different, 
                                                          
57 Source: Nestlé internal data by GFK (2011). 
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something that was not even allowed by Nestlé headquarters in Switzerland. Clearly a 
radical decision had to be made and so, after several months of struggling with Nestlé 
standards and guidelines, the Portuguese NDG team managed to get permission to start 
selling other brands inside NDG capsules, becoming yet again, the first market to 
accomplish such an achievement. 
These were not just any brands however, they were Buondi and Sical (See exhibit 
15), two Portuguese coffee brands owned by Nestlé, which had a combined history of 
nearly 90 years in the country. Buondi and Sical were favorites amongst the out-of-home 
coffee drinkers, as the first one was not available for purchase at modern distribution at 
the time. NDG was undoubtedly taking the coffee consumption transfer from out-of-home 
to in-home to a whole new level. Moreover, the rationale behind these two product 
launches was to challenge local competitors with Nestlé’s own local brands in an attempt 
to connect even further with coffee consumers and take advantage of the already created 
bond between them and the two brands. In the development stage of both blends, various 
efforts were made in order to make them as close as possible to what consumers were 
used to drink when going out for a cup of coffee at their favorite place.  Naturally, Buondi 
and Sical NDG capsules were a hit, regardless of the sales cannibalization effect observed 
on the other espressos58, a calculated risk in António’s opinion. Both SKU’s59 jumped 
instantly to the top five of NDG sales (See exhibit 16). Some consumers even admitted 
that if NDG did not offer Buondi or Sical that would have chosen a competitor’s capsule 
system60. Results again proved the hard work was not in vain.  
 
Present day – was sales promotion the answer?   
 Going back to that rainy April morning, António reflected upon the progressively 
shifting market landscape and how it posed exhausting, but exciting new challenges for 
the present year. 2012 was witnessed as the year that coffee capsule machines were 
regularly available for a bare €49 due to Delta Q and Pingo Doce’s recent moves. The 
competition’s promotion investment was not slowing down and António asked himself if 
                                                          
58 Source: Nestlé internal data (2011). 
59 SKU refers to Stock Keeping Unit, a unique product reference for sale. 
60 Nestlé internal data (2012). 
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NDG was going down the same path. Furthermore, the home appliance’s market was 
decreasing and showing no signs of future recovery61. Most importantly, the VAT 
increase from 13% to 23% imposed by the government in 2011 enlarged NDG’s standard 
capsules pack price from €4.79 to €5.21 (See exhibit 15). This external condition put 
NDG in a delicate position of becoming the only player in the market selling standard 
capsule packs at a price-point above €5 (See exhibit 2). 
 Tough challenges could only be surpassed by setting ambitious goals. The sales 
target for that year was 105,000 machines, 150 million capsules for retail and 2 million 
capsules for the online store. Unsurprisingly, a way to achieve this mark was by resorting 
to sales promotions. Several sell-out oriented promotional activities were planned for that 
year. A sweepstake involving offering one year house rent to the winning participant, a 
bonus pack which contained select capsule varieties aiming to provide a tasting 
experience to consumers, POS implementations following the same logic as in previous 
years (ambassador stands, display stands, shop-in-shop, tasting events, and others), 
internet based activities on the online store, and many other types of promotional 
mechanics. In the end, the plan included many elements proven to be effective in the past, 
but the investment necessary was ruining NDG’s profitability. 
The time of the team meeting had come and on his way to room 305 António 
discussed with a colleague how NDG as a promotion driven brand was not his vision at 
all. Market share was being transferred to Delta Q and retailer brands and there was an 
urgent need to recover it. The gap between NDG and its competitors had to be increased 
again, but in the good way. To António’s astonishment, the answer could actually be 
hidden behind a sales promotion tactic. A very good way to decrease the constant 
investment of promotions was to create a brand new and differently sized capsules pack, 
one that would become a standard SKU. This meant that the only significant cost 
associated with the retailer would be related to a listing fee. António faced his team with 
three critical questions regarding the new pack:  
 How many SKU’s would be used for the new format? 
 Which ones would be chosen for it? 
 How many capsules would the new pack contain? 
                                                          
61 Source: Nestlé internal data (2012). 
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The first and second questions had a straightforward solution. Espresso Intenso 
was NDG’s top selling capsule variety (See exhibit 16), therefore it had to be considered. 
Still, Buondi and Sical were an undeniable success and continued growing at a fast pace. 
In addition, the latter were exclusive capsules for the Portuguese market which translated 
into more flexible production decisions. A consensus was found and it was decided three 
SKU’s would be included: Espresso Intenso, Buondi and Sical. The real issue was in the 
third question. 
Surely, the new pack had to be either larger or smaller than the standard one. Due 
to manufacturing issues, the minimum amount of capsules that could be put inside a NDG 
capsules pack was 12, hence the first option was found. As for the maximum, there were 
no constraints, but there had to be a reasoning underneath such decision. “A large pack 
containing 30 capsules would be ideal for a month worth of coffee consumption”, 
someone in the room said. António agreed, he looked at his colleagues and asked: “Should 
we sell in packs of 12 or 30 capsules?” (See exhibit 17). The brainstorm over the real 
dilemma had begun.  
As the discussion extended itself throughout the afternoon, another important 
issue arose: pricing. For the 12 capsules pack, the price per capsule could not be higher 
than NDG’s standard pack and surely it had to be priced closer the competition’s usual 
10 capsules pack. As a result, António approved €3.90 for the hypothetical 12 capsules 
pack. As for the larger one, there were indications from the finance department that in 
order to make it profitable the price reduction per capsule could not be higher than 4 cents. 
The corresponding price would then be €8.89 for a NDG pack containing 30 capsules 
(See exhibit 17). The next thing to do was a real life test to both formats. In order to help 
with this matter, the sales team, who were present at the meeting, were asked to negotiate 
with a hypermarkets retailer and list both SKUs in a few stores for a short period of time. 
The goal was to do marketing research at the point-of-sales where it was possible to 
observe shopper reaction to the new packs and through one-on-one in-depth interviews 
obtain additional and potentially essential insights.  
The day had been a long one and António Sousa could not help but feel tired and 
somewhat discouraged about how tough and hostile the industry had become. In fact, he 
was afraid his brand could not survive, in the long run, the aggressive promotions being 
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imposed by the market. Nevertheless, he had confidence that he and his team had found 
a sustainable answer that could be the break NDG needed.  
 
Conclusion 
Nearly two months after that unpleasant Friday of April the outcome of the new 
packs’ field study was finally disclosed. For the 12 capsules pack, nearly all questioned 
shoppers failed to visually notice the difference when compared to a standard NDG pack, 
some even complained saying they were tricked by the new size by not being able to tell 
the difference. Subsequently, in a few cases the lower price was indeed detected, but 
perceived as a temporary price reduction. One shopper declared “If the price is the same 
as the 16 capsules I do not see the advantage”, while another had a more positive opinion 
saying “It is a good pack for the end of the month when I do not have so much money to 
spend”. As for the 30 capsules one, price per capsule being more important versus per 
pack was the key learning originated from most interviewed shoppers. “This fits 
completely my needs in terms of number of capsules and price”, one woman responded. 
António had in his hands what he believed were polarizing results, yet he recognized a 
slight tendency of one over the other. Even so, his question remained the same: a smaller 





Exhibit 1   Portugal Top Coffee Capsules Brands 
Brand 
Volume* Value** 
2010 2011 2010 2011 
Nespresso 0.62 0.47 0.65 0.51 
Nescafé Dolce Gusto 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.24 
Delta Q 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.16 
Retailer Brands 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.07 
Tassimo 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Others 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 
TOTAL*** 398 575 126 175 
Growth + 45% + 44% 
* Market share % in number of capsules. 
** Market share % in sales value €. 
*** Total in absolute value millions €. 
Source: Nestlé internal data (2011). 
 
Exhibit 2   Competitors Capsules and Machines Portfolio 









































































































Exhibit 3   NDG Machines 2007 Portfolio 
Source: Nestlé internal data (2007). 
 
Exhibit 4   NDG Capsules 2007 Portfolio 
 
* White cups beverages are prepared using 2 capsules; therefore a pack contains a total of 8 beverages. 











































World Total 8.46 
* Millions of metric tons. 
Source: UN Food & Agriculture Organization (2011). 
 
































Czech Republic 4.0 
Brunei 4.0 
Honduras 3.9 
Costa Rica 3.8 
Israel 3.8 














Dominican Republic 2.3 
Qatar 2.2 
Haiti 2.1 
* Kilograms per person per year. 
Source: World Resources Institute (2008). 
 




Nestlé 10.4 11.5 
Kraft Foods 5.5 5.9 
Retailer Brands 3.4 3.8 
Sara Lee 2.3 2.6 
JM Smucker 1.3 1.5 
Others 25.8 28.6 
TOTAL 48.7 53.9 
Growth + 11% 
* Sales value billion €. 
Source: Euromonitor International (2011). 
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Delta 39.4 53.7 
Nestlé 49.7 45.9 
Retailer Brands 29.1 38.9 
Massimo Zanetti 5.4 5.1 
Nutricafés 6.5 5 
Others 87.1 107 
TOTAL 217.2 255.6 
Growth + 18% 
* Sales value million €. 
Source: Euromonitor International (2011). 
 
Exhibit 9   Coffee Capsules Top 10 Countries 
Country 2011*  
France 1.60  
Germany 0.98  
USA 0.73  
Netherlands 0.47  
Italy 0.31  
Spain 0.30  
Switzerland 0.25  
Belgium 0.22    
Austria 0.16    
Portugal 0.16    
* Sales in billion dollars. 
Source: Euromonitor International (2011).  
 
Exhibit 10   World Top Coffee Capsules Companies 
Company 2011* 
Nestlé 34.7 
Sara Lee 17.7 
Kraft Foods 8.1 
Green Mountain 7.6 
Lavazza 1.3 
Others 30.6 
* Market share % in sales value. 
Source: Euromonitor International (2011).  
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Nescafé Dolce Gusto 29 
Delta Q 18 




* Market share % in coffee capsule machine sales. 
** Cumulative number of coffee capsule machines in millions. 
Source: Nestlé internal data (2011). 
 
Exhibit 12   NDG Path to Purchase Perspective 
 






























































































Exhibit 14   NDG Current Machines Portfolio 
 




Exhibit 15   NDG Current Capsules Portfolio  
 
* Only available online. 
All packs contain 16 capsules and are priced at €5.21. 







 Sical  Buondi 
 Latte 
Macchiato 
 Cappuccino  Cappuccino 
Light 
 Cappucino Ice 
 Nesquik  Nestea Peach 
 Chococino 
 Espresso*  Café Lungo* 
















Exhibit 16   NDG Capsules Sales Rankings  
SKU* 2011** 
Espresso Intenso 35.4 
Espresso Ristretto 17.5 
Buondi 14.6 
Sical 10.7 




Latte Macchiato  2.8 
Cappuccino Light 0.9 
Nestea Peach 0.7 
Cappuccino Ice 0.6 
* Excluding SKU’s sold exclusively online. 
** Volume sales (KG) in % of total NDG sales. 
Source: Nielsen Market Track (2011). 
 
Exhibit 17   NDG 12 and 30 Capsules Packs 
 





Sales promotions effectiveness and preferences 
Chandon et al. (2000) conducted a series of studies to American and French 
respondents with the goal of discovering if monetary savings are alone in explaining 
consumer response to sales promotions, in addition to understanding whether different 
benefits of a promotion impact how effective it is. In one of the studies, several monetary 
and nonmonetary promotions were evaluated on how they were influenced by promotion 
benefits, according to hedonic and utilitarian dimensions (See TN exhibit 1). Results 
showed that monetary promotions were predominantly associated with utilitarian 
benefits, whereas nonmonetary ones were more heterogeneously evaluated. In another 
study (See TN exhibit 2), purchase intensions were examined between utilitarian and 
hedonic products, divided by categories of high-equity and low-equity brands, and the 
effects of doing a promotion versus not doing one were analyzed. The outcome revealed, 
most notably, an exponential market share increase in utilitarian products belonging to 
high-equity brands after a monetary promotion was activated, whereas a nonmonetary 
promotion produced fairly modest results in the same product category. For hedonic high-
equity hedonic products results were similar, yet proportionally inferior.  
Further sales promotions literature encompasses a study conducted within the 
Porto region by researcher Ana Moura (1997), in order to determine Portuguese 
consumers’ sensitivity towards promotions. The author concluded that consumers were, 
in general, hardly motivated to retrieve information about the benefits and attributes of 
different options available in the market. Purchases were influenced by ongoing 
promotions, especially for consumers who were not loyal to the brand they were 
considering. This influence was as great as the involvement and risk associated with the 
transaction. Consumers valued promotion advantages that were certain and immediate, 
while not preferring overdue rewards as much. Moreover, price reductions and extra 
product offers were the most appreciated mechanics. On the other hand, the least 
welcomed promotions were collecting proofs-of-purchase, which give consumers the 





 Increasing the gap: How Nescafé Dolce Gusto strived in a hostile competitive 
environment case was written by João Lamarão under the supervision of Professor Paulo 
Gonçalves Marcos. Its preparation was based on real events, albeit using a fictional 
character as the main actor; however data was properly altered in order to preserve 
company confidentiality. Consequently, it is meant to be used solely within the 
boundaries of a class room and not as primary data for third party readers. 
The following suggested readings should help lecturers and students to better 
understand the underlying concepts within this case: 
1. Kotler, P., Armstrong, G., Wong, V., Saunders, J., 2008. Principles of Marketing. 
Fifth European Edition: Pearson Education. 
2. Chandon, P., Wansink, B., Laurent, G., 2000. A Benefit Congruency Framework 
of Sales Promotion Effectiveness. Vol. 64, pp 65-81. Journal of Marketing. 
3. Moura, A., 1997. Promotions des Produits de Marque et Comportement d’Achat 
du Consommateur en Grande Surface: Cas de la Grande Distribution dans la 
Région de Porto – Portugal, pp 166-177, Ph.D. Dissertation, Institut Politechnique 
de Lorraine, France. 
 
Synopsis 
 Nescafé Dolce Gusto (from now on referred as NDG), a coffee capsule system 
brand owned by the Nestlé Group, the largest fast-moving consumer goods company in 
the world, first appeared in Portugal in 2007. At the time, its older brother Nespresso was 
the sole player in the market and the availability of coffee capsules was still restricted to 
the online channel and Nespresso’s own boutique stores. Having identified this gap, 
Nestlé decided to give continuity to the coffee capsules trend and launched NDG in 
modern distribution, becoming the first coffee capsule system brand obtainable at 
supermarkets and hypermarkets. In addition, the brand’s most differentiating attribute 
was being able to provide not only varieties of coffee, but also other types of beverages, 
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either hot or cold ones. Just a few months later, Delta, Portugal’s leading coffee brand, 
launched its own system: Delta Q. 
 The Portuguese single-serve coffee industry was one of the most dynamic and 
challenging worldwide. Proof of that was the fact that it was the first country to have a 
retailer brand launch its own coffee capsule system back in 2010. In 2011 the sales growth 
for capsules was 44% both in volume and value. However, this type of business greatly 
relied on the capacity to place coffee capsule machines inside the homes of consumers. 
Portugal had the highest penetration rate when compared to the rest of the world at 35%, 
the leader being Nespresso, followed immediately by NDG and Delta Q. 
 The environment had become increasingly competitive and NDG was slowly 
starting to fall behind. Sales promotions were one of the most important industry growth 
drivers and the investment required to proceed on doing them was substantial. The brand 
had clear strategic directives aiming at avoiding sales promotions whenever possible, yet 
its competitors were not showing any signs of slowing down. A key milestone was the 
launch of Buondi and Sical, two national roast and ground coffee brands owned by Nestlé 
which enjoyed high levels of notoriety and for the first time were being converted into 
coffee capsules. This event considerably leveraged NDG’s sales. Still, additional efforts 
had to be made in order to recover market share. 2012 was believed to be the year when 
NDG would finally increase the gap versus its competitors again. In that year, the 
Portuguese government imposed a VAT increase from 13% to 23%. An external 
circumstance initially identified as a reason for a sudden downfall, could be transformed 
into an opportunity for the brand to do something different. This tax increase rendered 
NDG as the only player selling a capsules pack above the €5 mark and it was crucial to 
understand if this posed as a barrier to consumption. Ironically, a sales promotions related 
solution was suggested: to launch a differently sized promotional capsules pack. The 
question now was whether this new format was going to be a 12 capsules or 30 capsules 




Suggested Assignment Questions 
 The following questions should be considered as an analysis and discussion 
guideline for students: 
1. Analyze NDG’s position in the Portuguese market by examining all the internal 
and external dimensions António needs to take into consideration when making 
decisions. 
2. Describe NDG’s main source of competitive advantage which was vital to achieve 
its position in the market today. 
3. In the context of sales promotions, choose three different activities used by NDG, 
discuss their objectives, advantages and disadvantages, and provide future 
recommendations. 
4. Identify the reasons behind NDG having decided to launch a differently sized 
capsules pack. Provide your initial advice to António on which format is the 
most suitable option.  
5. For each pack, calculate how many capsules NDG would have to sell in order to 
achieve break-even point and based on your solution assess which is the better 
option from a financial point of view. Assume the following data to aid in your 
answer:  
  12 caps pack 30 caps pack 
Variable costs                1,08 €                 2,70 €  
PFME62          300 000 €           750 000 €  
Other production costs                0,08 €                 0,20 €  
   
% of total capsules retail target 15% 
Retailer margin 20% 
 
Teaching Objectives 
The following are the considered teaching objectives for this case: 
1. To understand the behavior of the coffee industry both in Portugal and in the 
world, with significant emphasis on coffee capsule systems; 
                                                          
62 PFME: Product Fixed Marketing Expenditures. 
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2. To show how often times having a first-mover advantage does not guarantee a 
company’s long-term success; 
3. To highlight how the rivalry between manufacturers and retailer brands is shaping 
FMCG, especially in Portugal and the harsh environment companies are facing 
nowadays in a sales promotion-driven industry; 
4. To illustrate the relevance and power of local brands in a coffee market such as 
the Portuguese one; 
5. To generate a debate around sales promotions as one the most important growth 
drivers for brands nowadays, discussing the available techniques and their 
effectiveness; 
6. To acquire insights on whether a packaging format decision could improve sales 
of a product; 
7. To entice an analytical and numerical discussion aimed at taking accurate and 
tangible managerial decisions based on financial data. 
 
Use of the Case 
 The key purpose of this case is to be utilized for class discussion on strategic 
marketing decisions companies require on making in order to become increasingly 
competitive. It aims to illustrate how several marketing tools can be strategically used in 
order to give a brand the upper-hand against its competitors, with a clear focus on sales 
promotions. For that reason, this case can be used in either undergraduate or graduate 
marketing related courses such as: strategic marketing, marketing communications or 
brand management. Nonetheless, due to its business strategy nature it can also be used in 
strategic management courses. 
 
Relevant Theory 
5 C’s Analysis 
 Before formulating marketing strategies it is crucial to understand the internal and 
external business environment. Avery and Steenburgh (2010) pointed out the 5 C’s 
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analysis (See TN exhibit 3) as a tool to identify such elements as it outlines five distinct 
dimensions of marketing environment with the ultimate goal of providing managers the 
appropriate foundations prior to making decisions. The 5 C’s analysis comprises 
customers, context, company, collaborators and competition. 
 The first dimension involves understanding customers’ needs, what motivates 
consumption and the decision making process behind it. Secondly, examining the context 
refers to the role of external factors (economic, socio-cultural, political/legal and 
technological) as platforms for business opportunities. As for the third dimension, 
company, managers should carefully determine what their business model is, figuring out 
what is the firm’s core activity and how does it achieve financial results. Regarding 
collaborators, assessing the suitable partners who will help the company achieve its goals 
by creating business synergies is vital. The latter can commonly be suppliers, distributors 
or retailers. Lastly, measuring competitors’ strategies and understanding how they pose 
as a threat is the last dimension of the 5 C’s analysis. 
Porter’s Generic Competitive Strategies 
 Michael Porter (1985) grouped a set of competitive advantages into three generic 
strategies which companies can use in order to achieve the upper hand over the 
competition. A fourth strategy was later identified as a combination of the previous three 
and represents a situation where companies should not aim to be at (See TN exhibit 4). 
 The first strategy is cost leadership and it refers to a company’s ability to produce 
goods and/or services in the most cost effective manner possible. Commonly it results 
from scale economies, learning effects, technological innovation, etc. 
 The second strategy is differentiation and it consists of selling a product with 
specific characteristics which are valued by customers. It can result from the product’s 
attributes or performance, intangible elements and adaptation to consumption behaviors 
or to particular customer necessities. The benefit of such strategy comes from the 
company’s ability to adequately value its offering in a way that the customer prefers it 
over the competition. Typically it is translated into a policy of high margins and low 
volumes or vice-versa. 
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 The third strategy is focus and it involves concentrating all efforts in a particular 
market segment. Additionally, it can be combined with a cost leadership or differentiation 
competitive advantage. Adopting a focus strategy allows the company to define its own 
market boundaries where it can benefit from specific gains and as a consequence reduce 
pressure from competitors.  
 The fourth and final generic strategy is middle of the road. Some companies will 
attempt to be differentiated and highly cost effective while targeting a niche market 
segment, only to later realize they lack real commitment to any of the previous strategies 
and in the end do not obtain competitive advantages. Porter advises businesses to follow 
only one of the first three generic competitive strategies in the interest of becoming truly 
successful in the marketplace. 
Sales Promotions 
 Kotler (2008) defined sales promotions as a set of techniques which have the 
ultimate purpose of increasing sales. While not being considered a sale by itself, sales 
promotions prepare the path to the transaction, creating an event that can strike its target 
audience and awake the will to buy. In this perspective, sales promotions can be separated 
into consumer promotions, such as price cuts, coupons, sweepstakes, etc., and trade 
promotions (or retailer promotions), which include special discounts, free goods, among 
others. Naturally, the objectives and the techniques used within the sales promotions 
scope differ depending on who is the target. 
  
Analysis and Discussion 
 The proposed basis for analysis and discussion of this case is translated into six 
assignment questions, which are allocated according to the following structure of a 90 
minute long class: 
I. External and internal analysis 
Question 1: Situation analysis ……………………………...... 20 minutes 




II. Marketing assessment 
Question 3: Sales promotions ………………………………... 15 minutes 
Question 4: Dilemma recommendation ……………………… 15 minutes 
Question 5: Dilemma solution ………………………………... 20 minutes 
Below is the recommended reasoning for each assignment question: 
1. Analyze NDG’s position in the Portuguese market by examining all the internal 
and external dimensions António needs to take into consideration when making 
decisions. 
A useful framework used to perform a detailed examination of the market 
environment is the 5 C’s analysis (See TN exhibit 3). It provides extensive information 
on internal and external variables by describing five distinct dimensions: customers, 
company, competition, collaborators and context. 
Customers  
For NDG, the customer dimension refers to shoppers and consumers. When 
looking at overall FMCG buying behavior, the Portuguese are revealed to be spending 
less per act of purchase, although purchasing more often, while increasingly preferring 
large retail areas (Page 6). They are also very mindful of prices, as their buying decisions 
are rational and demanding, being constantly on the lookout for promotions (Page 7). 
When considering the total coffee industry, it is fair to say that while not being an 
exceptionally large market, Portugal has still a respectable size and consumption per 
capita at 4.3 kg (Page 13), which is slightly below the world average of 4.8 kg per capita 
(See exhibit 6), taking into account the 50 country sample data. It is known that 76% of 
the population drinks coffee away from home, while the 24% remaining do it in-home 
and are growing in number from previous years (Page 13). This growth rate is extremely 
important for NDG given that its target consumer is the home coffee drinker. When 
observing solely the single-serve coffee industry however, where NDG operates, Portugal 
becomes the 10th most valuable country in the world (See exhibit 9). Growth levels are 
high at 45% in volume from 2010 to 2011, which translated in a total of nearly 400 million 
capsules sold last year. This data is undoubtedly a good indicator of the coffee capsules 




The 2nd dimension to be examined is context, which involves understanding the 
role of the following external factors: 
Economic: The economic crisis lived in Portugal is by far one of the biggest 
threats to NDG’s business. Being the 2nd worst performer in Europe, most of its 
population admit feeling a direct impact from the crisis. The effects of inflation and 
substandard wages bear consequences on overall purchasing power, which is the lowest 
in 27 years (Page 6). As a result, the industry is driven by sales promotions where retailers 
and manufacturers are forced to engage in price reductions and other types of mechanics 
in order to drive consumption levels up, at the cost of margins and profitability (Page 7). 
Socio-Cultural: The Portuguese are typically coffee drinkers. Approximately 76% 
of the population follow this habit, mostly out-of-home, where they are avid consumers 
of the bica63. However, a shift in consumption location pattern is witnessed: from 2009 
until 2011 in-home grows from 20% to 24%. This is where coffee capsules grow towards 
being one of the most preferred types of coffee. (Page 14). 
Political/legal: The severe conditions in Portugal and its FMCG industry are 
intensified by a VAT increase of 10% which the government announces to be an effective 
measure for 2012, in an attempt to recover from the crisis (Page 6). This tax adjustment 
only brings the expenditures of Portuguese households even further, since retailers and 
manufacturers do not let go of their margins by adjusting prices, in this case above 
previous levels. 
Technological: Technology plays a major role in NDG’s success and the single-
serve coffee industry in general. It is due to the technological breakthroughs that allowed 
for a cup of coffee to come out of a small capsule that Nespresso reached the place where 
it stands today. The patents protecting it for many years finally began to expire and 
subsequently other brands began investing in this market segment (Page 10). As NDG 
follows its older brother’s footsteps, it develops its unique kind of capsule which is then 
used with the first multi-beverage system in the world (Page 11), showing its own creative 
use of technology incorporated into its value proposition. 
                                                          




As part of Nestlé, the leading coffee company worldwide (See exhibit 7), on top 
of being closely related to coffee capsules pioneer Nespresso, NDG naturally inherited a 
set of competencies which allowed it to become a top performer today. In Portugal, it is 
the 2nd biggest player in capsules (See exhibit 1) and in machines (See exhibit 11). The 
relationship between these two types of products within NDG and its partner Krups must 
be clearly understood. NDG only profits from selling capsules, even though it designs the 
machines and defines their entire marketing communications strategy. Krups, on the other 
hand, is exclusively responsible for manufacturing and selling machines to retailers, 
consequently collecting their profits (Page 12). Its product portfolio comprises a diverse 
array of machines ranging from €79 to €169, which much like the competition they come 
in a variety of shapes and colors (See exhibit 14). In addition, it consists also of similarly 
varied assortment of capsules packs, which represent 20 different kinds of beverages, hot 
and cold ones, including pure coffee, coffee specialties, chocolate flavored and even tea 
ones (See exhibit 15). Indeed, NDG aims to be perceived as a multi-beverage system 
(Page 11). All packs contain 16 capsules and cost €5.21. However, some packs, internally 
denominated white cups, only allow the consumer to make a total of 8 beverages due to 
the fact that each beverage requires 2 capsules to make (See exhibit 15). This is NDG’s 
way of doing price differentiation within its capsules portfolio, as white cups have a 
higher cost per beverage. NDG is also the first and only brand to sell previously known 
roast and ground coffee brands in capsules, namely Buondi and Sical, two brands highly 
familiar to Portuguese consumers (Page 19). Regarding distribution and availability of 
both machines and capsules, NDG was the first coffee capsules brand to be obtainable at 
modern distribution channel (Page 11). At home appliance stores, only machines are 
available, whereas at hypermarkets and large supermarkets both machines and capsules 
are sold, and in small supermarkets just the latter (Page 12/13). At food retailers, the shelf 
space is shared with other roast and ground coffee products (Page 13). 
Collaborators 
Krups, a brand specialized in small household electric appliances, is the vital 
partner responsible for producing NDG’s machines (Page 11). Consumers cannot 
experience a NDG beverage without a machine. Therefore, it is imperative that this 
partnership works as efficiently as possible regarding the way synergies are created 
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between both brands when outlining the strategy to place a coffee capsule machine inside 
the homes of Portuguese consumers. Other collaborators in this business are the retailers 
who put the brand’s products available at physical locations attainable for shoppers, 
whether they supermarkets and hypermarkets or home appliance stores (Page 12). 
Competition 
NDG’s main direct competitors are amongst other manufacturers, as well as 
retailer brands, namely: 
Nespresso: The first coffee capsules brand in the world, Nespresso is still the 
market leader in Portugal, yet it considerably decreases its market share from 2010 to 
2011 (See exhibit 1). It offers only coffee beverages and the positioning is, since the 
beginning, a highly premium one, having the quality of its coffee as the main 
differentiating element (Page 9). This fact reflects in both its capsules and machines 
prices. It has over 20 different coffee flavors, ranging from €3.75 to €4.55 for a pack of 
10 capsules. Its assortment of machines is also wide and prices go from €99.99 to €599.99 
(See exhibit 2). Consumers can obtain Nespresso capsules and machines by visiting the 
brand’s online store or a Nespresso Boutique store. 
Delta Q: The coffee capsule system brand owned by Portugal’s leading coffee 
company Delta (See exhibit 8), appeared around the same time as NDG (Page 15) and 
today enjoys the 3rd place in coffee capsules market share rankings (See exhibit 1). It is 
also a multi-beverage system, adopting a more mainstream positioning, however bearing 
a close resemblance to Nespresso’s premium strategy (Page 15). Delta Q also offers 10 
capsules per pack, alternating between €2.99 and €3.29 for each pack, providing nearly 
20 flavors of coffee and tea. Its array of machines is varied, selling one for as little as €29, 
all the way up to €499 (See exhibit 2). Regarding distribution, it has the same availability 
as Nespresso and NDG, being present at modern distribution, online and at its exclusive 
boutique stores. 
Pingo Doce: The first retailer worldwide to introduce a coffee capsule system own 
brand (Page 15). It is 4th in Portugal, being is the fastest growing player (See exhibit 1). 
It is a much more price-conscious oriented brand, selling in packs of 16 capsules, offering 
7 different coffee flavors at €3.52 each pack, while having only one machine in its 
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portfolio at €49 (See exhibit 2). Logically, it is only available for purchase at Pingo 
Doce’s stores. 
Concerning indirect competitors, even though the case does not focus on them, it 
is worth mentioning that all other coffee manufacturers selling roast and ground coffee as 
a substitute to coffee capsules are also threats to NDG’s business, especially Portugal’s 
market leader Delta (See exhibit 8). 
 
2. Describe NDG’s main source of competitive advantage which was vital to achieve 
its position in the market today. 
NDG’s main source of competitive advantage should be equivalent to at least one 
of Porter’s four competitive advantage strategies (See TN exhibit 4). To decide on which, 
all four of them should be carefully analyzed. 
First of all, it should be concluded on whether NDG has a cost leadership 
advantage. Is it able to produce and sell its machines and capsules in an efficient way 
causing it to be more attractive than the competition’s offerings? This was true until Pingo 
Doce came into the coffee capsules market landscape. Its own CCS brand completely 
disrupted the market in terms of pricing. For instance, it was responsible for dropping the 
average machine price from €144 to €87 (Page 15). A coffee capsule machine was the 
gateway to capsules consumption and if NDG could not assure this better than its 
competitors than it could not leverage its position through a cost leadership advantage. 
The second source of competitive advantage to consider is differentiation. Is 
NDG’s ability to enhance its position in consumers’ minds as a clear and unique value 
proposition what sets it apart from competitors? Its wide range of capsule varieties and 
differently designed machines was a sign of innovation (See exhibit 14 and 15). NDG 
aimed to be a true multi-beverage system and indeed it offered a set of beverages that 
none of its competitors could achieve (See exhibit 2). A good example was the exclusive 
availability of Buondi and Sical capsules (Page 18) which consumers admitted to be a 
differentiating element to the brand.  
The third strategy to reflect upon is focus: the ability to target a very specific 
market niche and ultimately conquer it. The coffee capsules industry was growing two 
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figures per year (Page 15), while it was a niche market when Nespresso first appeared in 
2003, it could not be considered like this anymore. Moreover, NDG’s purpose was to aim 
at a broader target (Page 11), it did not focus its strategy on delivering its products to a 
small captive audience, as it clearly wanted to become the most complete multi-beverage 
system of the market. 
Finally, was NDG’s strategy a “middle of the road” one? Did it strive to be cost 
effective, unique and focused all at the same time but achieved none extremely well? 
From the previous analysis it is clear that NDG’s main source of competitive advantage 
was indeed being able to adopt a differentiation strategy and as a consequence achieve its 
goals. 
 
3. In the context of sales promotions, identify the activities used by NDG, discuss 
their objectives, advantages and disadvantages, and provide future 
recommendations. 
Throughout the case NDG is shown to have taken advantage of the following sales 
promotion activities: 
Sweepstakes (Page 16): Their main goal is to promote an increase in sales and in 
brand awareness. They can potentially get major media coverage, favoring brand 
advertising and often times allowing for cooperation between brands. Yet, they do not 
have any immediate impact on the consumer and the cost associated with such activity is 
independent of how many consumers participate. 
Temporary price reductions (Page 16): This strategy aims to reward loyal 
consumers, while enticing the disloyal ones. It is known to be highly appreciated by 
consumers, being simple to implement and the effects are significant if consumers are 
price sensitive. Nonetheless, it is not adequate for premium brands and if used too often 
it can potentially damage brand image. 
Tasting events (Page 17): This technique has the purpose of attracting new 
consumers by doing one-on-one communication of the brand and also aims at increasing 
sales. Tasting results in greater resistance to forgetfulness, potentially increasing the 
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probability of future purchases. However, it can be considered less “generous” when 
compared to other types of sales promotions. 
Point-of-sale materials (Page 17): They have the objective of boosting sales, 
increase brand visibility and encourage impulse purchases. Visually highlighting products 
is definitely the great advantage, while it also be used with other promotion mechanics 
and potentially achieve positive synergies. However, they are usually temporary, 
depending on how they are negotiated with retailers and they require greater maintenance, 
constantly needing to be stocked in order to preserve the visual appeal. 
Taking into account the available literature, it is possible to make an assessment 
on how NDG’s choices in sales promotion activities are affecting its performance and 
whether there is still room for improvement or not. Utilizing the results from the Benefit 
Congruency Framework of Sales Promotion Effectiveness by Chandon et al. (2000) (See 
page 36 and TN exhibit 2), and assuming NDG as a high-equity brand, due its strong 
position in the market today, and coffee as a hedonic product (as the author puts it), some 
conclusions can be drawn. The only monetary promotion used by the brand is a temporary 
price reduction exclusive to its online store (Page 16), whereas nonmonetary promotions 
are predominant, which is in line with the strategy of avoiding sales promotions whenever 
possible (Page 20), as nonmonetary promotions require less investment by the company 
and do not affect profitability as much. Surprisingly, monetary promotions destroyed 
market share in this category, while the opposite occurred with nonmonetary ones. 
Conversely, Ana Moura’s (1997) study on the Portuguese population shows their 
preferences lean precisely towards monetary promotions, although the author does not 
distinguish utilitarian from hedonic products in the analysis. Consumers value promotions 
that provide them instant and assured benefits. 
NDG is correct to use nonmonetary promotions as they seem to offer greater gains 
in market share, yet Portuguese consumers appear to largely prefer monetary promotions. 
Combining both studies reveals the need to further investigate the Portuguese situation 
by means of the methodology employed by Chandon et al., as the former’s conclusions 




4. Identify the reasons behind NDG having decided to launch a differently sized 
capsules pack. Provide your initial advice to António on which format is the most 
suitable option.  
The financial crisis was the main trigger for the challenging situation where most 
companies were nowadays. Less purchasing power means consumers spend less and 
therefore consume less. A consequence of this downfall was a VAT increase from 13% 
to 23% (Page 6). This could only bring the population to an even more fragile condition 
in terms of managing their expenses. Such an increase in taxes meant that a NDG standard 
16 capsules pack went from €4.79 to €5.21 (Page 19). Staying at a price-point above €5 
could become barrier to consumption, due to the fact that all competitors managed to keep 
its prices below this line. Subsequently, the best tangible way for companies to fight this 
harsh setting is to invest in sales promotions, which bring prices down to the final 
consumer, but also carries lower levels of margins and profitability for firms (Page 7). 
NDG was no exception to the rule, as seen from its recent sales promotion strategy (Page 
19). As stated by António Sousa, this path was not what he intended for the brand, as it 
was slowly turning NDG into being promotion driven. At the same time, competitors 
were extremely active and aggressive in their actions. Even though NDG’s sales were still 
growing, Delta Q’s and Pingo Doce’s were growing faster (See exhibit 1). In the end, a 
new capsules pack format could potentially cause NDG to significantly recover market 
share, if the right number of capsules per pack was chosen. At a glance, this can already 
be a differentiation element for the brand, as most competitors offer 10 capsules per pack, 
with the exception of Pingo Doce which offers the number as NDG (See exhibit 2).  
 If António is to choose 12 capsules per pack the price per pack will considerably 
drop to €3.90 (Page 21), although the price per capsule will stay at the standard €0.33, 
the same as with the 16 capsules pack. With 30 capsules the opposite will occur, as the 
price per pack will rise to €8.89, but at only €0.30 per capsule (See exhibit 15). Each 
possibility offers clear advantages in terms of savings to the final consumer, even though 
the 30 capsules pack proves to be more cost effective. The issue here is on whether the 
consumer can interpret this saving or not. Are they going to perceive a lower price-point 
as an immediate saving, or are they willing to spend more per act of purchase and achieve 
greater savings in the long run? Results from the market study done on shoppers (Page 
22) show a preference for the larger pack, as price per capsule is indeed identified as being 
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more important, hence the cost effective nature of the pack is recognized. The smaller 
pack, on the other hand is mistaken by a standard pack due to its similar dimensions, and 
the lower price is incorrectly associated with a price discount over it. Nonetheless, some 
shoppers reveal that this is a good pack for the end of the month when they do not have 
so much money to spend. Another possible standpoint that can help deciding between one 
of the two new formats is the fact that with 12 capsules, NDG compromises the market 
share gains it set as a goal, considering 30 capsules per pack puts a substantially greater 
amount of product inside the homes of current and potential NDG consumers, providing 
them a whole month of coffee supply (Page 21).   
 As a result of a purely qualitative analysis, it can be therefore concluded that 30 
capsules per pack is a better option for the new format. 
 
5. For each pack, calculate how many capsules NDG would have to sell in order to 
achieve break-even point and based on your solution assess which is the better 
option from a financial point of view. Assume the following data to aid in your 
answer:  
  12 caps pack 30 caps pack 
Variable costs                1,08 €                 2,70 €  
PFME64          300 000 €           750 000 €  
Other production costs                0,08 €                 0,20 €  
   
% of total capsules retail target 15% 
Retailer margin 20% 
  
A manager’s decision making process does not rely only on research and 
qualitative insights. A product’s financial assessment and viability is an inevitable step to 
take in order to achieve maximum profitability. Through the available data António Sousa 
is able to calculate the break-even point for each new pack and conclude which one will 
return profit sooner. 




                                                          
64 PFME: Product Fixed Marketing Expenditures. 
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𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘 − 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 (€) = 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘 − 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 (𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘) × 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 (𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘) 
To begin with, it is necessary to determine the target volume for the new packs, 
taking into consideration the total capsules target for the retail channel (Page 21): 
Total retail target (capsules) = 150 000 000 
New pack target (capsules) = 150 000 000 × 15% = 22 500 000 
Before independently analyzing each option, it must be pointed out the fact that 
the price per pack referred throughout the case (See exhibit 17) includes VAT. 
Consequently, this tax effect must be removed from the price, since manufacturers and 
retailers do not take it into consideration during negotiations. 
Choosing 12 capsules pack 
Retail price w/ VAT 3.90 € 
VAT 23% 
Retail price w/o VAT 3.90 × (1 − 0.23) = 3.00 € 
 
NDG price w/o VAT 
Retail price w/o VAT × (1 − Retailer margin) = 





= 1 875 000 packs 
 
Total fixed costs 
PFME + Target (pack) × Other production costs = 
300 000 + 1 875 000 × 0.08 = 450 000 € 
 
Contribution margin (pack) 
NDG price w o⁄ VAT − Variable costs = 





= 𝟑𝟒𝟎 𝟐𝟗𝟎 𝐩𝐚𝐜𝐤𝐬 




Choosing 30 capsules pack 
Retail price w/ VAT 8.89 € 
VAT 23% 
Retail price w/o VAT 8.89 × (1 − 0.23) = 6.85 € 
 
NDG price w/o VAT 
Retail price w/o VAT × (1 − Retailer margin) = 





= 750 000 packs 
 
Total fixed costs 
PFME + Target (pack) × Other production costs = 
750 000 + 750 000 × 0.20 = 900 000 € 
 
Contribution margin (pack) 
NDG price w o⁄ VAT − Variable costs = 





= 𝟑𝟐𝟒 𝟏𝟕𝟗 𝐩𝐚𝐜𝐤𝐬 
BEP (€) 324 179 × 5.48 = 𝟏 𝟕𝟕𝟓 𝟐𝟖𝟓 € 
  
Even though the 12 capsules pack has considerably lower marketing fixed costs, 
albeit an also lower contribution margin, the fact that each pack contains only 12 capsules 
makes the proposed total target significantly higher than the one determined for the 30 
capsules pack. As a consequence, this translates into the larger pack being able to start 
making profit approximately 16 000 packs sooner than the first option. At the end of the 
day, this outcome gives António and the NDG team full confidence on choosing how 






TN Exhibit 1   Sales Promotions Benefit Matrix 
 
Source: Adapted from Chandon, P., Wansink, B., Laurent, G., 2000. A Benefit Congruency Framework of 
Sales Promotion Effectiveness. Vol. 64, pp 65-81. Journal of Marketing. 
 
TN Exhibit 2   How Benefit Congruency Influences Sales 
Promotion Effectiveness 
 
Source: Adapted from Chandon, P., Wansink, B., Laurent, G., 2000. A Benefit Congruency Framework of 
Sales Promotion Effectiveness. Vol. 64, pp 65-81. Journal of Marketing. 
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Source: Adapted from Avery, J., Steenburgh, T., 2010. Marketing Analysis Toolkit: Situation Analysis. 
Harvard Business School. 
 
TN Exhibit 4   Porter’s Generic Competitive Strategies 
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